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The received theory on public goods asserts that private provision of them is at best in-
efficient and at worst virtually non-existent due to the severity of the free rider problem. This
assertion has received additional theoretical1 and experimental2 support recently. However, in a
recent paper, Bagnoli and Lipman [1986] have studied a simple contribution game in which all of
the proper equilibria in pure strategies are Pareto efficient and all strongly, individually rational
Pareto efficient outcomes can be supported as a proper equilibrium in pure strategies. In other
words, in this game, the free rider problem does not appear to be severe enough to keep the citizens
from privately providing the efficient level of the public good. Our purpose in this paper is to
report on some experimental evidence that supports the conclusion reached in Bagnoli and Lipman
(hereafter B&L). That is, our results suggest that if private provision is adequately modeled by
the B&L's game, then private provision of public goods is predominantly efficient. We should note
that there is supportive anecdotal evidence. In 1980 and 1985 the New Democratic Party (NDP)
of Manitoba. Canada sent letters to its larger contributors explaining the need for additional funds
to mount the coming election campaigns. The letters explained the need for a certain amount of
money, $200.000.00 in 1980 and $250,000.00 in 1985. The letters included an explanation of how
the money was to be used and promised to refund the contributions if less than the required amount
was contributed. We learned that in 1985, total contributions were $251,300.00 or about % more
than the required total.3
As B&L argued, one interpretation of their result is that they have produced a "fairly
natural" game that resolves an apparent conflict between the recent theoretical work on private
provision and the older mechanism design literature. In the literature on mechanism design, it was
shown that there exist mechanisms that implement many different social choice correspondences
each of which require the selection of a Pareto efficient outcome.4 Unfortunately, it appears that
this work was understood to have required a social planner to implement and mediate the game.
This may explain why the recent theoretical work, cited above, has focused on the study of the
1 See, for example, Palfrey and Rosenthal [1984, 1985], Bergstrom, Blume and Varian (1986], Andreoni [1985] and Comes
and Sandier [1985a, b].
2 See, Schneider and Pommerehnie [1982], Marwell and Ames [1981], Kim and Walker 11984), Isaac, Walker and Thomas
[1984], Isaac, McCue and Plott [1985], Andreoni [1986], and Harrison and Hirshleifer [1986].
3 We wish to thank Ron Cavalucci for providing us with this information.
4 See the recent survey by Groves and Ledyard [1985] for details and references.
properties of "fairly natural" games that might describe the process of private provision in the
absence of a social planner. Thus, since Bagnoli and Lipman have studied a game that could well
describe the process of private provision in the absence of a social planner, they may have studied
one of the games that links the two literatures together.
However, their results depend on the application of a refinement, properness, to the def-
inition of an equilibrium. Consequently, it becomes very important to determine whether the
restriction to proper equilibria in pure strategies is reasonable or not. However, there is, another
reason for undertaking the experiments. They will provide an alternative approach to the study of
the severity of the free rider problem. Studying this issue has been one of the major focuses of much
of the experimental work on private provision of public goods. This work was triggered by the casual
observation that private provision of public goods is not virtually non-existent which suggests that
the free rider problem might not be as severe as received theory seemed to suggest. Examples of
naturally occurring instances of high levels of private provision of public goods include public radio
and television, many charities and many local public goods such as gardens, playgrounds, parks.
museums, and concerts. Additional examples include the provision of industry lobby groups. other
lobby groups supported by private contributions, and the setting and enforcing of private industry
standards for safety, quality, etc. One obvious explanation is that such behavior was the result
of other motives, for example, altruism. Another obvious explanation is that received theory had
been interpreted over zealously. That is, the free rider problem is severe enough to cause private
provision to be inefficient but not severe enough to cause it to be approximately zero. This version
of the free rider problem has come to be known as the weak form of free riding.
This controversy led to an experimental investigation of free riding.5 The motivating idea
was that a laboratory setting would permit the experimenter to isolate the effects of any non-
pecuniary motives which had been suggested as a possible explanation for the observations men-
tioned in the previous paragraph. Unfortunately, their results were mixed. Some appeared to find
no support for the strong version of the free rider hypothesis while others appear to have found
some support for the weak version. Basically, most found that a positive but inefficient level o~f
provision was obtained.
Isaac, McCue and Plott [1985] argued that the results might have been mixed due to flaws in
5 See the papers cited in footnote 2.
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the experimental design. In particular, they argued that one might need to provide the participants
with time to learn the game. If that were true then the one-shot experiments which, by definition,
do not give the participants time to learn the game, might be flawed. However, correcting for this
and other flaws does not appear to alter the general conclusion that the experimenters find some
support for the weak version of the free rider problem but none for the strong version.6
One important aspect of the experimental design which IMP did not consider is common to
all but one of the experiments with which we are familiar. 7 Every experimenter modeled the private
provision of a public good as a prisoners' dilemma game. The apparent explanation for this is that
the traditional view of the problem of private provision is that free riding is an important feature
that leads to inefficient provision. Thus, the experimenters were led to adopt a standard game whose
equilibrium is inefficient. Unfortunately, the prisoners' dilemma game has an additional feature:
players have a dominant strategy, not cooperating. The theoretical literature had already moved
away from this representation recognizing it as an inadequate model. Basically, they realized that
an individual's optimal contribution for the private provision of the public good would depend on
the contributions of the others. The idea is that if the individual's willingness-to-pay for the next
little bit of the public good exceeds the cost then this individual's optimal choice is to contribute
something. The obvious question is can this dependence on the choices of others ever happen. If it
cannot then the prisoners' dilemma game is an adequate representation of the problem. However,
it is clear that it does occur but that its importance depends on the actual contributions of the
other members of the society.8
The following example is not meant to explain what the contributions of the individuals
will be but simply to illustrate that their optimal contribution should depend on the contributions
of the others. Having done this. we will have demonstrated that the use of the prisoners' dilemma
game is inappropriate in modelling private provision. In our example, let there be n people in the
society and suppose that each of them is willing to pay x for the first unit of the public good. If
the individual that we focus on, say person 1, believes that the contributions of each of the others
6 We find it interesting that no one has proposed one of the most likely explanations for these results. The experimenter
can only induce valuations. He or she cannot guarantee to each player that the induced valuation is truly the other
player's utility. That is, the experimenter cannot ensure that the players are playing a game of complete information. It
is well known that equilibria in the prisoners' dilemma with incomplete information do not require that players choose
not to cooperate. Obviously, there is no way to avoid this problem as it is inherent in the rnethodology of experimental
economics but it should be remembered that it exists and may well explain what are otherwise anomalous results.
SThe exception is a recent piece by Harrison and Hirshleifer which we will mention briefly below.
8 We have recently learned that a similar argument has been made by Frohlich and Oppenheirner [191701 and Frohlich,
Hunt, Oppenheimer and Wagner [1975].
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will be ag then this individual's best action will depend on his or her belief about the sum of the
others' contributions. Let o = 22o_. If c is the cost of the first unit, and if c - a is positive
and greater than this individual's valuation, z, then this individual's optimal contribution is zero.
However, if c - o is less than x, then the optimal contribution is positive. To see this simply note
that z> c - a-> 0 implies that x+a > c. Therefore, there is a contribution, oi which is less than
z such that o1 + o = c. If this contribution is made, then person 1's net benefit is positive, x - 01,
which exceeds the net benefit of contributing nothing. The net benefit of contributing nothing is
0 because the individual gave nothing but no units of the public good were provided either. Thus,
we must conclude that the prisoners' dilemma game is an inadequate representation of private
provision of public goods.
Our work is most closely related to a recent paper by Harrison and Hirshleifer. Their work
is an attempt to study, in an experimental setting. some of the conclusions Hirshleifer reached
in an extremely interesting paper he wrote in 1983. In it, he considered different types of public
goods that he identified by their production technology. Most relevant to this discussion, only one
of the types is supposed to be adequately represented by a prisoners' dilemma game. Hirshleifer
suggested that received theory would apply differently to the different types of public goods. The
Harrison and Hirshleifer paper seeks to study Hirshleifer's conclusions in an experimental setting.
Unfortunately, there are may be a potential difficulty with their test. Hirshleifer studied games of
complete information, that is, games in which all of the relevant data is known to every player.
This includes the value the other players' place on the public good. However, their experimental
design forces the players to play a game of incomplete information. So, even though there may
be some question as to whether their work can be taken as an experimental test of Hirshleifer's
original work, it remains an interesting and important extension to our understanding of private
provision because of its contribution to our understanding of private provision in non-prisoners'
dilemma games.
We can surnmnarize by saying that our research pursues three objectives. The first is to
determine whether the restriction to proper equilibria is appropriate. The second is to provide
additional information concerning the severity of the free rider problem in the context of one miodel
of private provision of public goods. Our third objective follows frorn the arguments just presented.
The experimental work on public goods has not focused on a sufficiently wide set of underlying
4
games and one of our contributions will be to report on the results based on the game studied by
Bagnoli and Lipman.
Our results suggest that the restriction to properness is appropriate. For the last five
periods, we found the participants' contributions yielded the efficient level of provision 100% of the
time. We report the last five periods here in response to the concerns raised by Isaac, McCue and
Plott, who argued that the participants needed time to learn the game. Obviously, our results show
that the free rider problem is not severe enough to prevent the private provision of public goods in
this game. Clearly, this suggests that since the free rider problem is more severe in other games,9
it is important to begin the study of the choice of game through which the public good is privately
provided. This provides additional support for the position that a wider set of underlying games
needs to be studied if we are to get a better understanding of private provision.
One striking result from our experiments is that the efficient outcome is achieved even when
the participants are very different. In some of our sessions, the individuals had equal valuations but
different incomes while in others, they had equal incomes but different valuations. In fact, some of
the differences were quite large. In spite of this, these groups were as capable of efficient provision
as the group that contained participants with identical incomes and valuations. What is perhaps
surprising is that in the sessions in which the participants differed, some were identical but did not
choose the same levels of contributions. That is, there is clear evidence of strategic play during the
sessions.
In the next section we provide a relatively brief description of the game that underlies our
experiments. In section 3 we describe the experimental design. Section 4 contains the results and
our conclusions are presented in Section 5.
9 We are alluding to the other recent theoretical work cited earlier.
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2. The Model
The complete description of the game on which our experiments are based may be found
in Bagnoli and Lipman [1986]. We present a brief summary here. B&L study a contribution game
in which the agents choose how much money to contribute for the public good. They studied two
kinds of decisions, only one of which will concern us in this paper. The decision considered here
is whether or not the public good is provided.10 That is, the citizens have a simple decision: to
provide the public good or not. Our description of the game will be cast as a decision to provide a
streetlight or not.11 The streetlight will illuminate the property of several persons and, as such, it
is a public good. B&L show that, under very weak conditions on the individuals' utility functions,
the efficient decision will result. In this paper, we will restrict attention to the case in which the
efficient decision is to provide the streetlight. Thus, B&L's theorem implies that the equilibrium
has the streetlight provided from the voluntary contributions of the individual agents.
More formally, consider an economy with I agents indexed by i = 1,2,... , I. These agents
must choose a decision d from the set {0,1}. One interprets 0 as the decision not to build the
streetlight and 1 as the decision to build. Each agent benefits from the presence of the streetlight.
though agents may not benefit equally. More precisely. assume the utility function of the z agent
is ui(d. wi) where we is the in agent's wealth and assume that
u; (1, wi) > u; (0, w;) VU ?, i = 1, 2, . .. , I.
Also assume that for all i, u; is continuous and strictly increasing in wi. Without loss of generality.
adopt the normalization ui(0. wi) = 0 for each i. Define the valuation of agent i, vi implicitly by
u t(1, og - vi) = 0 (- ug(0, w=)).
The last assumption made is that w; > vi for all i-that is, u(1, 0) < 0. This assumption is made so
10 B&L also studied the situation in which the decision is not only whether to provide the public good but in what quarit ity
We intend to study this version experimentally in a future paper.
11 Obviously, casting our discussion in this framework does not limit the analysis to this framework. In particular, any
public good whose provision may be cast as a zero-one decision immediately fits this framework. If it cannot, then it can
be cast in the framework of the multiple streetlight problem also studied by B3&L. In that version, one imagines providing
the first bit of the public good, the second bit, and so on. Alternatively, one may employ this version to study the "size"
of the streetlight to be provided. Under somewhat more restrictive assumptions on the utility functions, B&L have proveni
the same theorem for the more than one unit case. we intend to test this result, experirnentally, in future work
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that one need not consider what happens when some agents would like to contribute more than their
wealth. Only games of complete information are considered so that all of the above information
(including each utility function) is common knowledge.
The cost of providing the streetlight is c > 0. which is also common knowledge. Bagnoli and
Lipman suggest that a seemingly natural way to consider the problem of how agents get together
to jointly provide the streetlight is to suppose that they contribute money toward building it.
They study a game in which the streetlight is provided if the contributions add to c or more and
any contributions in excess of c are kept. In the event that contributions sum to less than c, the
streetlight is not provided and contributions are returned.'2
Thus, the formal description of the game has each agent's strategy set Si = [0, w, . A
strategy choice by i is denoted of and is interpreted as this agent's contribution. If Ejo; > c,
then the public good is provided and all contributions are kept. In this event, the payoff to i is
u=(1, w; - a,). Otherwise the good is not provided and the payoff to i is u (0. wi) which has been
normalized to equal 0. For this simple game B&L prove the following theorem.
Theorem 1: All proper equilibria in pure strategies have eficient outcomes. Furthermore.
any Pareto efficient, strongly individual rational outcome is realized as a proper
equilibrium in pure strategies.
That is, the outcome of the game is Pareto efficient if the outcome corresponds to a proper
equilibrium in pure strategies. The proof is provided in Bagnoli and Lipman [1986]. The intuition
is quite straightforward. If E v= < c, then the efficient outcome is to choose d = 0. That is, if the
sum of the valuations is less than c then it is better not to provide the streetlight. In this case, it
is clear that no Nash equilibrium has the sum of the contributions greater than c. This happens
because no individual would choose to contribute more than vi when the sum of the valuations is
less than c.
If the sum of the valuations is just equal to c then either decision is Pareto efficient. If
the sum of the valuations is greater than c. the case is more complex. First, note that a Nash
U Clearly, other institutions are possible. For exarnple, the contributions could be kept even if the good is not to be
provided. As B&L point out, such arrangernents raise the possibility of insufficient contributions and is therefore an
alternative worthy of study.
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equilibrium in pure strategies cannot have the contributions add to strictly more than c since any
contributor would then prefer a smaller contribution. Hence all proper equilibria in pure strategies
certainly have Eg u; < c. To see that one can eliminate the possibility that contributions are strictly
less than c is more difficult and is the heart of the proof of the theorem. Those interested in the
proof are referred to the paper. Here, we try to provide a little intuition as to why it is true.
There are many Nash equilibria in the game. As stated earlier, when the efficient decision
is d = 0, all Nash equilibria have this outcome since each agent will refuse to contribute more
than v, if there is a nonzero probability that such contribution will lead to d = 1. However, when
the efficient decision is d = 1, there are many Nash equilibria, some of which lead to inefficient
outcomes. Focusing on the pure strategy equilibria only, the Nash equilibria fall into two groups.
First, any vector of contributions satisfying oi < v and Eg e; = c is a strong Nash equilibrium.
Hence these equilibria satisfy all of the regularity properties ever proposed for Nash equilibria.
Second, any vector of contributions satisfying c - Eug y > v= is also a Nash equilibrium and has
d = 0. It is these equilibria that are removed by the restriction to proper equilibria and it is intuitive
that they are not robust.
To see this, note that if the agents other than i might "tremble" upward in their contribu-
tions, then. so long as i's contribution is less than vi, i wishes to increase his contribution to increase
the probability that he earns a positive payoff.13 In fact, a small possibility of such trembles is
enough to make i strictly prefer a larger contribution. 14
From the model we can derive a number of testable hypotheses. First, all proper equilibria
produce an efficient outcome. Thus, the good will be provided when the sum of the valuations
exceeds its cost. Further, the sum of the contributions will be equal to the cost of the good. In the
experimental setting we provided that the sum of the valuations was greater than the cost of the
good in all cases. Thus we state our first testable hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1: The public good will be provided and the contributions will sum to its cost.
13 Recall that his utility function has been normalized so that if the streetlight is not built, his payoff is zero
14 Those familiar with the use of refinements will note that this argument essentially suggests that equilibria w it h d -
are not "trembling hand" perfect. This is not quite correct as one can find trembles that will support such a decisioni
However, these trembles must be to dominated strategies. Thus it is reasonable that the application of properness remove
these cases. For details the reader is referred to B&L.
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That is, the subjects will attain the equilibrium described in the model. There are two
possible ways to falsify this hypothesis. First, the contributions may sum to less than the cost of
the good and, as a result, the good would not be provided. Second, the good is provided but the
contributions sum to more than the cost of the good. The fact that violations of the predictions
can occur both ways is worth keeping in mind when we discuss the empirical results.
Second, individual rationalityrequires the subjects to bid not more than the value of the
public good to them. We may state this explicitly as:
Hypothesis 2: No subject will bid in excess of his valuation in tokens since this is the
maximum he may obtain from the provision of the good.
Third, to handle one of the objections leveled by Isacc, McCue and Plott, the game will be
played a finite, known number of periods in the experiment and we announced that the subjects
would remain in their groups for the duration of the experimental session. The reason is that
allowing the game to run for several periods permits the subjects to learn the game. This has both
benefits and costs. The benefits are that it may well be important for the players to "learn" the
game. If so the repetitions will be valuable in providing a better understanding of their play. The
cost is that in a repeated game, especially one with as many stage equilibria as the one employed,
there are many subgame equilibria. However, the usual backward induction argument allows us to
state our third hypothesis 15:
Hypothesis 3: A subgame perfect Nash equilibrium is a sequence of single period game
equilibria. That is, the sequence of single period Nash equilibria forms a subgame
perfect Nash equilibrium in the repeated game.
Fourth, recall that Theorem 1 admitted the possibility of several equilibria with the hy-
pothesized properties. One conjecture is that the equilibrium actually achieved depends on the
distribution of income. Such a possibility may arise because of the multiplicity of equilibria in the
game. That is, the multiplicity of equilibria will make it more difficult to achieve the equilibrium
in these situations as the players strive to end up in an equilibriurn in which their contributions
15 We note here that caution must be employed when analyzing the data to ensure that this is the subgame perfect
equilibrium played. In fact, we will show that there are no "end game effects which suggests that this potential problem
may not have arisen.
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are smaler.. Loosely speaking, the idea is that the players may attempt to strategically manipulate
their contributions in order to affect the equilibrium they eventually settle down to. If this occurs,
it will manifest itself as fluctuations in the level of contributions from period to period as the agents,
in essence, attempt to solve the distribution of surplus associated with the provision of a public
good as well as the provision game. To evaluate this possibility we introduced skewed income and
valuation distributions in the experimental sessions. We state the relevant hypothesis asi:
Hypothesis 4: For more skewed income and valuation distributions it will be harder for the
subjects to achieve an equilibrium.
Fifth, Theorem 1 holds regardless of the number of agents in the economy. That is, the
theorem is true regardless of the number of players in the game.17 As a practical matter. most
would believe that the free rider problem becomes more severe as the size of the group rises. That
is, a larger group may be less likely to attain the equilibrium than a smaller one. Accordingly, we
have conducted the experiment for groups of five persons and of ten persons. We state the relevant
hypothesis as:
Hypothesis 5: Group size has no impact on the ability of the group to reach the equilibrium.
Pareto efficient level of contributions.
SAgain, caution will be necessary in drawing conclusions here. We are simply providing a standard story for why cert in
equilibria may be focal and conjecturing that the less obvious is the focal equilibrna, the less likely the players are t .
achieve one of the proper equilibria.
SThis may, at first, seem iroubling because there is a well known intuition that suggests that it is false. The intuition goes
as folows: as the number of players gets large, the effect of their choosing not to contribute becomes negligible Hence,
as the number of players gets large, the provision must become inefficient. The theorern proved by~ B& L shows t hat t his
is not correct for this game. In the equilibrium, aul contributors are pivotal. That is, a change in any conitritot(r'.s accion
has a sufficiently important effect on the result so that he has no incentive to change his contribution In other words
the equilibrium resolves the negligibility problem endogenously.
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3. The Experimental Design
The experimental environment is designed to implement the features of the game described
above and consists of the following conditions. Subjects are assigned to a group in a random fashion.
They are informed that the task is to enter a contribution toward the provision of a public good.
The public good is described as yielding a specified return to each member of the group. If the
good is provided, each subject in the group will receive the payoff from provision plus their initial
income less their contribution to the public good. Each knows the number of people in their group
but not their identities.18 The subjects are informed of (1) their own income, (2) the incomes of the
other members of their group, (3) the cost of the public good, and (4) the payoff to each member
of the group if the good is provided. Further, the subjects are told that the experimental session
will last for a specific number of periods and that they will be in the same group for each period.
As well, they know that the level of the required total contribution and the incomes will remain
constant over the duration of the experiment. The players are required to choose contributions
simultaneously-without knowledge of the choices made by the other members of their group.
Consequently. they play a game of complete but not perfect information.
Clearly, the description of the design of our experiment captures the features of the game
studied by Bagnoli and Lipman. The subjects have complete information on w;, v,, and c. They
also know n, the number of members of their group, and that the session will last for a known, finite
number of periods with the same parameters in effect for all periods. We induce the valuations in
the approved manner [Smith, 1975. That is, we issue the subjects with tokens which are redeemed
by the persons running ,the experiment when the sessions are completed. We post the exchange
rate for the tokens prior to the start of the sessions and maintain it throughout the session. Finally
the subjects are informed of the aggregate level of contributions for their group at the end of each
stage or period.
Our subjects were recruited from undergraduate students at the University of Michigan and
the University of Windsor. The instructions were distributed and read aloud. A copy is provided
in the Appendix.
18 This is done so that there is no possibility of pre-play communication and to ensure that they truly choose without
knowing the choices of the other members of their group.
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For each period the subjects received an "information slip" like the one provided in the Ap-
pendix (or a modified version for the sessions where the subjects were assigned different valuations).
The incomes, valuations, and group sizes were entered by the experimenters and the subjects were
required to enter their contribution in the space provided.
Questions were answered and the subjects tested to be "certain" they understood the in-
structions. The subjects had been arranged so that they were unable to learn the identities of the
other members of their group and they were provided with the information slips for all periods. The
experiment commenced and the subjects were requested to enter their contribution to the public
good for the first period.
Once all of the contributions had been entered, the slips were collected by the persons
running the experiment and the contributions were totaled. Then the total contributions for each
group were written on the board. This ended the first period. The contributions for the next period
were then solicited and the process repeated for all periods.
As we discussed in connection with Hypothesis 4 we wished to examine the effects of skewed
income and valuation distributions on the provision of the good. Thus we introduced this as an
experimental treatment. To repeat, the incomes and valuations of the individual subjects remained
constant throughout the session. As with all of the other data for our experiments, this information
appears in the Appendix in the tables labeled "Incomes and Valuations".
For each of these five-person groups cost of the public good, referred to as the threshold
contribution level, was 12.5 tokens. If the public good was provided, then the additional bundle of
tokens was set at 25 tokens. That is, the increase in social welfare if the public good is provided is
12.5 tokens (25 - 12.5).
Theorem 1 holds regardless of the number of persons in the group contributing to the
provision of the public good. However we felt that it was important to test this result. We have
done this by forming two groups with ten persons each. These groups were included in a session
with several groups of five persons. The valuations were constant across the members of the groups
(five tokens) and we report their incomes in a table in the Appendix. For the ten person groups




We ran seven sessions with a group size of five and two sessions with a group size of ten. In
response to the criticism of the previous experimental work by Isaac, McCue and Plott, we chose
to have the participants make choices in each of fourteen periods.'9 The exogenous information
which was known to each member of a group-the number of people in the group, their incomes,
and their valuations-are reported in tables in the Appendix. 20
In addition, all of the raw data, the participants' contributions, are reported in tables 2.11-
2.21. We report the raw results for two reasons. First, we feel that summary statistics may not
convey enough information and second, the test of the second hypothesis requires that we check
each individual's contribution in each period. We also provide two summaries of our data. Each is
designed to aid in the test of the other hypotheses. In tables 1A and 1B we summarize the raw data
by computing total contributions for each group, for each period. This will provide the clearest
test of hypothesis 1.
Tables 3 and 4 provide an alternative viewpoint for testing hypotheses 3-5. They are based
on the fact that we have induced the valuations of the subjects. Consequently, we may compute the
social welfare for each of the groups. The theoretical' welfare maximum is defined to be the sum of
the valuations of the members of the group plus their incomes minus the sum of the contributions
at the theoretical equilibrium.2 1 When the good is provided, actual social welfare is computed as
the sum of the valuations plus the sum of the incomes minus the actual contributions. If the good
is not provided, social welfare is simply the sum of the incomes because contributions are return in
this case.
The most striking result that we have to report is that in the overwhelming majority of the
cases, the collective good was voluntarily provided. The evidence thus far offers tentative support
19 'The number of periods was announced prior to the start of the session.
20 All tables can be found in the Appendix.
21 Recall that the parameters of the experiment are such that it is efficient to have the good provided in each case.
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for Hypothesis 1 (the good is provided in the majority of the cases). Taking all fourteen periods,
the contributions sum to 12.5 tokens or more in 85 of the 98 possible cases.
The theory predicts that all of the proper equilibria induce the efficient outcome. In our
experiments, that means that the sum of the participants' contributions should be 12.5 tokens. If the
level is above this then all subjects will prefer a lower level of contribution. If we take 12.5 tokens to
be the equilibrium then we achieve this in only 53 of the 98 cases. The theory is defined over games
of complete information and, while we provided the subjects with all information regarding the
incomes and payoffs of the members of their groups (as specified by the theory), the experimental
methodology prohibits ensuring complete information. It is possible for the participants to believe
that a "fool" or an individual who doesn't purely care about his or her monetary reward is playing.
Further, the existence of many equilibria raises the possibility that the subjects may not be able to
easily coordinate on a given equilibrium. Thus we enlarge the definition of equilibrium to include
aggregate contributions in the range 12.0 to 13.0 tokens.2 2
Under this relaxed definition the subjects have achieved an efficient equilibrium in 75 of the
98 cases. The impact of the behavioral classification of equilibrium is particularly apparent in the
groups with rather uneven distributions of income or valuation. Under the strict definition Group
16, for example, attains the Pareto efficient equilibrium only one time. With the more relaxed
definition of the equilibrium it achieves the proper equilibrium in nine periods. A similar sort of
behavior is apparent in Group 12. In contrast, groups 14 and 17 hit upon an equilibrium vector
of contributions quite early and maintained this throughout. The results described in the previous
paragraph provide substantial support for Hypothesis 1. The collective good is provided and the
contributions sum to the efficient level. Our results are very strong when we focus on the last five
periods only (to allow for learning). We have an efficient outcome (contributions sum to 12 to 13
tokens) in all thirty-five cases. This outcome is consistent with the subjects having "learned the
game."
Hypothesis 4 seems to receive some support also. The groups with skewed income or
valuation distributions appear to have more difficulty attaining the efficient contribution level
22 There are many ways to classify the data. We have already noted that the public good is provided in 85 of the~ 9
cases. That is, contributions were in excess of 12.5 tokens in these 85 cases Thus, the game exhibits very little free
riding. Allowing for some coordination problems and allowing for the fact that we may not have a clear focal equibrinuni,
defining equilibrium contributions to be any contribution between 12.0 and 13.0 tokens appears to be qute stringent
14
H owever, we cannot overlook the results of Groups 14 and 17. Each, 14 in particular, was able
to reach an efficient equilibrium (narrowly defined) very quickly despite the differences in income
across subjects. This conclusion needs to be tempered by the fact that, while these groups do
not have equal incomes and valuations, the differences are small. In particular, in both cases,
only one subject differs from the rest. Focusing on Groups 12, 13, 15 and 16, the groups with
significant differences among the subjects, we find that they did, in fact, have significantly more
difficulty providing the efficient level of the public good. If one compares the average welfare levels
of groups 12, 13, 15 and 16 to group 11, the probability that group 11 has a higher welfare level
than the average of the heterogeneous groups is .927. We have excluded groups 14 and 17 from this
comparison because, as we mentioned above, they are nearly homogeneous. Thus, we believe that
the correct interpretation of our results is that they lend some support to the Tiebout hypothesis
but that a definitive conclusion must await additional work on this question.
Social welfare for each five person group is reported for all periods and in aggregate in Table
3. The theoretical maximum for all fourteen periods is 945.0 tokens and is 337.5 for the last five
periods only. We can see that Group 14 attained the highest level (the theoretical maximum) of
any group. Several other groups had very high levels of social welfare as well. In fact, five of the
seven groups had welfare levels in excess of 95% of the theoretical maximum for all fourteen periods
taken together. The findings reported in Table 3 lend further support of Hypothesis 1.
We can compare the resulting welfare levels across groups to test Hypothesis 4. The theory
does not distinguish on the basis of the distribution of income or valuations. Since the only
differences should be attributable to learning we focus on a comparison using all fourteen periods
of the sessions. On the basis of a Mann-Whitney test [Conover, 1980, pp 216-228; we can not
reject the hypothesis that the behavior in the homogeneous group, Group 11, does not differ from
that of the non-homogenous groups (Groups 12 through 17). The probability that Group 11 has
higher welfare level over all fourteen periods is only 0.682. Similarly, there does not seem to be
any significant regularity between our treatments of non-homogeneity. On the basis of a Mann-
Whitney test we find the probability that the groups with skewed incomes (012, G13, and 014)
had higher levels of efficiency than the groups with skewed valuations (015, G 16, and G 17) is only
0.853 which is well outside the normal significance levels.
As further confirmation that any differences across groups should be due to learning behav-
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ior we may concentrate on the last five periods. We find that five of the seven groups attained the
theoretical maximum level of social welfare and a sixth, Group 16, was very close. In general, we
can say the subjects had "learned the game" by the last five periods.
Since our structure of incomes and valuations was symmetric we can do a pairwise com-
parison across the groups between those with skewed incomes and valuations. On the basis of a
Wilcoxon test [Conover, 1980] we can reject the null hypothesis that there is a difference by treat-
ment in all three of our cases. When we compare G 12 to G15 we obtain a t-statistic of 3.296 for
the null hypothesis that G12 has smaller values (efficiency levels) than G 15. Thus we reject the
null at 99%. For G13 vs. G16 the t-statistic is 1.538 so we reject the null at 94%. For G14 vs G17
we obtain a t-statistic of -3.296 and we cannot reject the null hypothesis (at 99%) that G14 has
smaller values than G17.
In Hypothesis 5, we predicted that a larger group will be as efficient in having the collective
good provided as the smaller group. However, a larger group may make it more difficult for the
subjects to focus on a particular equilibrium vector of contributions. The qualitative results appear
to support this conjecture. The larger groups (G20 and G21) provided the collective good in 19 of
28 possible cases. They attained the efficient outcome (24 to 26 tokens) in 17 cases. These levels are
lower than the comparable statistics for the five person groups. We may conduct a more rigorous
test by comparing the results (welfare levels) of the five- and ten- person groups (see tables 3
and 4 in the Appendix). Scaling the scores for the ten-person groups (G20 and G21) and using
a Mann-Whitney test we find that the probability the five-person groups have higher efficiency
scores is 0.987.
Our interpretation of this result is that it is more difficult for the larger groups to focus
on an equilibrium vector of contributions. By the last five periods, however, both large groups
had welfare levels that were better than 95% of the theoretical maximum level. With learning.
which apparently takes longer with the large groups, the subjects were approximately as efficient
in the larger groups as the smaller groups. Taking the last five periods we find the success rate
at achieving a Pareto efficient equilibrium to be eight of ten (80%) which compares favorably wit h
the results for the smaller groups.
The prediction underlying Hypothesis 2 is that all the agents will post contributions which
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are individually rational. That is, no subject will post a contribution greater than his/her valuation
of the collective good although all subjects have incomes in excess of valuations by definition of
the game. Recall that we have reported the individual contribution behavior in Tables 2.11-2.21.
Instances of irrational behavior (contributions in excess of valuation) are indicated by an asterisk.
It is clear that irrational behavior is very infrequent and occurs primarily in the early periods.
Of the 490 observations in the five-person groups only 7 are individually irrational. All but one
of these occurred during the first two periods and may be attributed to subject confusion with
the game. In all subsequent periods the subjects entered contributions which were individually
rational. In the ten-person groups we have only 4 of 280 observations where the contributions can
be classified as individually irrational. It is clear that Hypothesis 2 is well supported by the results
of the experimental sessions.
On the subject of individual behavior we have a very striking example of the strength of
the equilibrium presented in the theoretical discussion. In Group 14 the subjects happened to post
a Pareto efficient equilibrium vector of contributions in the first period. They maintained this
vector for the duration of the session. What is interesting is that the vector chosen in the first
period resulted in considerable wealth transfer to subjects 14/1 and 14/3 at the expense of 14 '2
in particular. However, subject 14,'2 was receiving a positive net return from this allocation and
his private incentive was to continue to post a contribution of 4 tokens since a lower contribution.
given the contributions of the other subjects, would have resulted in the collective good not being
provided.
Finally, as we noted above in Hypothesis 3, a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium is a sequence
of the Nash equilibria of the single period game. We ran the session for several periods to permit the
subjects to understand the members of their group. Yet, it is still necessary to check for end-period
effects to be certain the single period prediction is met. Unfortunately, due to the multiplicity of
the stage game equilibria the set of subgame perfect Nash equilibria is very large. The idea is
that an outcome can be supported by "threats" of movements to an equilibrium in which the
threatened player(s) are worse off than in the "desired" outcome.23 All except the equilibrium in
which the stage game equilibrium is played repeatedly may exhibit end game behavior. The lack
of explicit end game behavior in the experiment (see Tables 1A, lB and 2.11-2.21) lends tentative
support to the view that the equilibrium the subjects are focusing on involves repeating a stage
23 See Benoit and Krishna 119851 or Friedrnan 11986].
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game equilibrium.
These conclusions must be quite tentative because of the possibility that what we have re-
ferred to as "learning" can be confounded with non-stationary subgame perfect equilibria. In other
words. since we cannot guarantee that all believe they are playing a game of complete information.
we cannot definitively separate the effects of "learning" from the non-endgame behavior arising
from non-stationary subgame perfect Nash equilibrium.
5. Conclusion
We have reported on some experiments run using. as a basis, a game studied by Bagnoli
and Lipman. Their analysis suggested that if people used strategies that constituted a proper
equilibrium, then the equilibria of the game generated the efficient outcome. Our experiment s
clearly indicate that in the final 5 periods of the game, the participants always provided the public
good (the efficient choice as we had chosen parameters that made the participants' valuations sum
to more than the cost of the public good). Thus, it appears sensible to focus on the proper equilibria
of the game under analysis.
Second, we have shown that this game is likely to eliminate virtually all of the free rider
problems one normally fears may cause the private provision of a public good to be inefficient.
Third. we have provided evidence concerning the effects of studying games of private provision of
public goods that do not have the unsavory feature of a dominant strategy.
Our results clearly suggest that there are potential "natural' institutions which are capable
of efficient private provision of public or collective goods. Indeed the use of a similar institution
by the NDP (mentioned in the introduction) may be just such an example. Our experimental
results are very strong. We have established a plausible naturally occurring environment whereii
an equilibrium strategy for individual agents is to contribute positive amounts to the provision of a
public good so as to produce the efficient decision. Our results indicate that voluntary, decentralized
provision of such public goods can be theoretically and behaviorally predicted making it imperative
that we once again attempt to determine whether public goods are provided efficiently. Further,
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if we were to determine that they were not, we would need to question why institutions had not
arisen that would solve this difficulty.
Our results do indicate that skewed income or valuation distributions may make the attain-
ment of an equilibrium more difficult. As the agents attempt to discover an equilibrium strategy
they may sacrifice efficiency in that the good is not provided. Group 11 was successful in providing
the good and in doing so efficiently in all but one of the final ten periods. By contrast, some of the
other groups failed to have the good provided in many of the early periods. However. even these
other groups approached the equilibrium fairly early in the session and were almost exactly on
the equilibrium for the last five periods. Our results have provided some support for the Tiebout
hypothesis although additional work on this subject is needed.
In the overwhelming majority of the cases the subjects entered contributions which were
individually rational. "Overbidding" is not widespread. Any contribution which will have the good
provided is rational thus we have no concept of "underbidding" as long as the good is provided.
Subjects may engage in strategic contributing according to their estimates of the behavior of the
others in their group.
The larger groups were demonstrably slower to learn the game as shown by their lower
overall (all 14 periods) efficiency levels. However, even with ten persons these groups had settled
to near the Pareto efficient equilibrium by the last five periods of the session.
Ultimately we intend to extend our experiments to cover the multiple streelight case (that
is, to the question of how much of the public good is provided as well as whether any will be).




Andreoni, J., "Impure Altruism and Donations to Public Goods," University of Michigan Working
Paper, 1985.
Andreoni, J., "Why Free Ride?," University of Wisconsin Working Paper, 1986.
Bagnoli, Mark and Barton L. Lipman, "Can Private Provision of Public Goods be Efficient?."
University of Michigan working paper, 1986.
Benoit, J-P. and V. Krishna, "Finitely Repeated Games," Econornetrica, 1985.
Bergstrom, T. R., L. Blume. and H. Varian, "On the Private Provision of Public Goods," Journal
of Public Economics, 1986.
Conover, W.J., Practical Konparametric Statistics, (2nd ed) J. Wiley and Sons, 1980.
Cornes. R. and T. Sandler, "The Simple Analytics of Pure Public Goods Provision,'' Economica,
1985a.
Cornes, R., and T. Sandler, "On the Consistency of Conjectures with Public Goods," Journal/of
Public Economics, June, 1985b.
Frohlich, N., and J. Oppenheimer, "I Get By With A Little Help From My Friends." W4 orld Politics.
October, 1970.
Frohlich, N.,. T. Hunt, J. Oppenheimer, and R. H. Wagner, "Individual Contributions for Collective
Goods,' Journal of Conflict Resolution, June, 1975.
Friedman, J. W., "Trigger Strategy Equilibria in Finite Horizon Supergames," Journal of Economic
Theory, 1986.
Groves, T., and J. Ledyard, "Incentive Compatibility Ten Years Later," Northwestern University
working paper, 1985.
Harrison, G., and J. Hirshleifer, "The Provision of Public Goods Under Alternative Protocols and
20
Social Composition Functions: An Experimental Study," forthcoming Journal of Political
Economy, 1987.
Hirshleifer, J., "From Weakest-Link to Best-Shot: The Voluntary Provision of Public Goods,"
Public Choice, 1983.
Isaac, R. M., J. Walker, and S. Thomas, "Divergent Evidence on Free-Riding:"An Experimental
Examination of Possible Explanations," Public Choice, 1984.
Isaac. R. M., K. R. McCue, and C. R. Plott, "Public Goods Provision in an Experimental Envi-
ronment," Journal of Public Economics, 1985.
Kim, 0. and M. Walker, "The Free Rider Problem:"Experimental Evidence," Public Choice, 1984.
Marwell G. and R. Ames, "Economists Free Ride, Does Anyone Else?," Journal of Public Eco-
nomics, 1981.
Palfrey, T.. and H. Rosenthal, "Participation and the Provision of Discrete Public Goods," Journal
of Public Economics, 1984.
Palfrey, T., and H. Rosenthal, "Private Incentives in Social Dilemmas," Carnegie-Mellon working
paper, 1985..
Schneider,F., and W. Pommerehne, "Free Riding and Collective Action: An Experiment in Public
Microeconomics," Quarterly Journal of Economics. 1981.
Smith. V.L., "Experimental Economics:"Induced Value Theory." American Economic Review, Pa-




This is an experiment in decision making. Several research organizations have provided
funds for this research. The instructions are simple and, if you follow them carefully
and make good decisions, you may earn a considerable amount of money. This
money will be paid to you in cash at the end of the experiment.
Organization
You have been organized into groups each of five or ten persons. Each group will
consist of the same five or ten persons for the duration of the session. The session
itself will last for ten or fourteen periods. The number of periods will be announced
prior to the start of the session. In each period you will be required to make a
decision and your total income from the session will depend on these decisions.
The specific identities of the other persons in your group will not be revealed to you.
You may not communicate with anyone else in the room during the session.
The actual number of persons in your group along with other information is reported
on a set of information slips that have been provided to you. You have been given
one slip for each period of the session.
At the beginning of each period you will receive an income in tokens. These tokens may
be exchanged for money at a rate stated on your information slips. Also provided
on these slips is the income of each of the other persons in your group. This is
private information. That is, you are not to reveal it to anyone else in the room.
You will be asked to post a contribution in each period. You will have three minutes
to enter your contribution. You may enter any contribution from zero up to the
amount of your income for the period. Contributions in excess of your income will
not be accepted. Enter your contribution on the slip of paper provided. You may
contribute part tokens, eg. 4.5 tokens.
Once the contributions have been entered, the slips will be collected by the persons
running the experiment. If the sum of the contributions of the persons in your
group meets or exceeds the threshold level that is stated on your information slips
you will each receive an additional income of tokens. The size of this addition
for the group and for yourself is also stated on the information slips. Your total
income for the period will be your initial income plus the additional tokens minus
your contribution.
If theaum of the co tributios. is less than the t eslold 1 l the additional tokens
will not be provided.lin this event your contribution wilY be returned to you and
your total income for the period will simply be your original income.
At the end of each period the persons running the experiment will inform you whether
your group has obtained the additional tokens. The total contribution of your
group but not the contributions of the individual members will be posted on the
board.
A set of information slips has been prepared for you. You have one slip for each period.
On each slip your ID number and the period appear in the upper right corner. As
well the slip tells you your income for the current period, the incomes of the other
members of the group, the number of persons in your group, and the share of the
additional tokens which will go to each member of your group. Finally, the slip
contains a blank where you are required to enter your contribution for the period.
An example slip and session are reported below.
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Example Information and Session
(a) Information Slip
Period # 1
Number of persons in your group is 5.
Threshold contribution of your group is 12.5 tokens.
If this contribution is met or exceeded the group will receive 25 additional tokens. Your
share of the additional tokens is 5 tokens. All members of your group receive this share.
Your Income 4.00 tokens





That is, your income is 4.00 tokens for this period. Of the others in your market, three
have an income of 4.00 and one an income of 9.00.
(b) Session: The required total contribution is 12.50 tokens. Say you contribute 2.00
tokens. Now, if the total is at least equal to 12.50 then you will receive 5.00 tokens
plus your initial income of 4.00 tokens less your 2.00 token contribution. Your
total income for the period is 7.00 tokens. This will be exchanged for money at
the end of the session by the person running the experiment.
If the total contribution of your market is less than 12.50 tokens you will receive
your initial income of 4.00 tokens for the period regardless of your own posted
contribution. That is, the additional tokens will not be provided in this period
and your posted contribution will be returned to you. This will be exchanged for
money at the end of the session by the person running the experiment.





The Number of persons in your group is
Threshold contribution of your group is ._ tokens. If this contribution
is met or exceeded the group will receive additional tokens. Your
share of the additional tokens is tokens. All members of your






Group 11 Group 12 Group 13
Subject ID* Income Subject ID Income Subject ID Income
11/1 11.0 12/1 16.0 13/1 16.0
11/2 11.0 12/2 16.0 13/2 14.0
11/3 11.0 12/3 8.0 13/3 11.0
11/4 11.0 12/4 .8.0 13/4 7.0
11/5 11.0 12/5 7.0 13/5 7.0
*The ID numbers use the format: Group Number/ Subject Number
Each subject's valuation of the public good was 5 tokens.
Group 14 Group 15 Group 16
Subject ID* Income Subject ID Valuation Subject ID Valuation
14/1 12.0 15/1 10.0 16/1 10.0
14/2 12.0 15/2 10.0 16/2 8.0
14/3 12.0 15/3 2.0 16/3 5.0
14/4 12.0 15/4 2.0 16/4 1.0
14/5 7.0 15/5 1.0 16/5 1.0
*The ID numbers use the format: Group Number/ Subject Number
Group 14's valuation of the public good was 5 tokens each.








*Equal incomes, 11 tokens
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Group 20 Group 21
Subject ID Income Subject ID Income
20/ 1 11.0 21/ 1 16.0
20/ 2 11.0 21/ 2 16.0
20/ 3 11.0 21/ 3 16.0
20/ 4 11.0 21/ 4 16.0
20/ 5 11.0 21/ 5 8.0
20/ 6 11.0 21/ 6 8.0
20/ 7 11.0 21/ 7 8.0
20/8 11.0 21/ 8 8.0
20/ 9 11.0 21/ 9 7.0
20/10 11.0 21/10 7.0
Each subject's valuation was 5 tokens.
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Table 1A
Total Contributions by Group in Tokens
Period Group Nurfiber
11 12 13 14 15
1 20.0 10.5 15.0 12.5 17.0
2 14.5 13.0 11.0 12.5 15.2
3 12.0 12.5 14.5 12.5 11.5
4 13.0 12.0 13.5 12.5 10.0
5 12.5 12.5 11.0 12.5 13.5
6 12.0 10.0 12.5 12.5 12.8
7 12.5 13.0 12.5 12.5 12.8
8 12.5 12.5 12.0 12.5 12.5
9 12.5 13.0 12.5 12.5 12.5
10 12.5 12.3 12.5 12.5 12.5
11 12.5 13.0 12.5 12.5 12.7
12 12.5 12.0 12.5 12.5 12.5
13 12.5 12.5 12.5 12.5 12.5
14 12.5 13.0 12.5 12.5 12.5
Table 1B
Total Contributions by Group in Tokens
Period Group Number
16 17 20 21
1 24.0 18.0 38.0 29.5
2 16.5 14.1 28.5 25.5
3 12.0 13.2 23.3 25.0
4 12.0 12.5 17.2 24.0
5 15.0 12.5 23.5 19.5
6 14.0 12.5 25.5 23.5
7 13.5 12.5 25.5 24.5
8 13.0 12.5 26.5 26.5
9 13.5 12.5 24.0 25.0
10 13.0 12.5 25.2 26.0
11 13.0 12.5 24.25 25.0
12 13.0 12.5 25.0 25.0
13 13.0 12.5 25.0 25.0




Period 1 2 3 4 5
1 3.5 4.5 3.5 5.5* 3.0
2 3.0 4.0 1.5 3.5 2.5
3 2.5 3.0 1.5 3.0 2.0
4- 2.5 3.0 2.0 3.0 2.5
5 2.5 3.0 2.0 2.5 2.5
6 2.5 2.5 2.0 2.5 2.5
7 2.5 3.0 2.0 2.5 2.5
8 2.5 3.0 2.0 2.5 2.5
9 2.5 3.0 2.0 2.5 2.5
10 2.5 3.0 2.0 2.5 2.5
11 2.5 3.0 2.0 2.5 2.5
12 2.5 3.0 2.0 2.5 2.5
13 2.5 3.0 2.0 2.5 2.5
14 2.5 3.0 2.0 2.5 2.5
Table 2.12
Group 12
Period 1 2 3 4 5
1 3.0 3.0 2.5 2.0 0.0
2 4.0 3.0 2.5 2.5 1.0
3 3.5 3.0 2.5 2.5 1.0
4 3.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 1.0
5 3.5 3.0 2.5 2.5 1.0
6 3.5 3.0 2.5 0.0 1.0
7 4.0 3.0 2.5 2.5 1.0
8 3.5 3.0 2.5 2.5 1.0
9 4.0 3.0 2.5 2.5 1.0
10 3.5 2.8 2.5 2.5 1.0
11 4.0 3.0 2.5 2.5 1.0
12 3.0 3.0 2.5 2.5 1.0
13 3.5 3.0 2.5 2.5 1.0




Period 1 2 3 4 5
1 4.0 3.0 4.0 2.0 2.0..
2 3.5 2.5 3.0 .1.0 1.0
3 4.5 3.5 3.5 1.5 1.5
4 4.0 3.0 3.5 1.5 1.5
5 3.0 2.5 3.0 1.0 1.5
6 3.5 3.0 3.0 1.5 1.5
7 3.5 3.0 3.0 1.5 1.5
8 3.5 3.0 3.0 1.5 1.0
9 3.5 3.0 3.0 1.5 1.5
10 3.5 3.0 3.0 1.5 1.5
11 3.5 3.0 3.0 1.5 1.5
12 3.5 3.0 3.0 1.5 1.5
13 3.5 3.0 3.0 1.5 1.5
14 3.5 3.0 3.0 1.5 1.5
Table 2.14
Group 14
Period 1 2 3 4 5
1 2.5 4.0 2.5 3.0 0.5
2 2.5 4.0 2.5 3.0 0.5
3 2.5 4.0 2.5 3.0 0.5
4. 2.5 4.0 2.5 3.0 0.5
5 2.5 4.0 2.5 3.0 0.5
6 2.5 4.0 2.5 3.0 0.5
7 2.5 4.0 2.5 3.0 0.5
8 2.5 4.0 2.5 3.0 0.5
9 2.5 4.0 2.5 3.0 0.5
10 2.5 4.0 2.5 3.0 0.5
11 2.5 4.0 2.5 3.0 0.5
12 2.5 4.0 2.5 3.0 0.5
13 2.5 4.0 2.5 3.0 0.5




Period 1 2 3 4 5
1 6.0 5.0 6.0* 0.0 0.0
2 6.0 4.2 5.0* 0.0 0.0
3 5.5 4.0 2.0 0.0 0.0
4 6.0 4.0 1.0 0.0 0.0
5 6.5 4.5 2.5* 0.0 0.0
6 6.3 4.5 2.0 0.0 0.0
7 6.3 4.5 2.0 0.0 0.0
8 6.0 4.5 2.0 0.0 0.0
9 6.0 4.5 2.0 0.0 0.0
10 6.0 4.5 2.0 0.0 0.0
11 6.0 4.5 2.0 0.0 0.0
12 6.0 4.5 2.0 0.2 0.0
13 6.0 4.5 2.0 0.0 0.0
14 6.0 4.5 2.0 0.0 0.0
Table 2.16
Group 16
Period 1 2 3 4 5
1 6.0 6.0 4.0 3.0* 5.0*
2 4.0 7.0 3.5 1.0 1.0
3 3.0 5.0 3.0 0.5 0.5
4 3.5 4.0 3.5 0.5 0.5
5 5.5 5.0 3.5 1.0 0.0
6 5.0 5.0 3.0 1.0 0.0
7 4.5 5.0 3.0 1.0 0.0
8 4.5 5.0 3.0 0.5 0.0
9 5.0 5.0 3.0 0.5 0.0
10 5.0 5.0 2.5 0.5 0.0
11 5.0 5.0 2.5 0.5 0.0
12 5.0 5.0 2.5 0.5 0.0
13 5.0 5.0 2.5 0.5 0.0




Period 1 2 3 4 5
1 4.0 5.5 2.5 3.5 2.5*
2 2.5 6.0 2.5 3.0 0.1
3 2.3 5.5 2.5 2.8 0.1
4 2.2 5.0 2.5 2.7 0.1
5 2.2 5.0 2.5 2.7 0.1
6 2.2 5.0 2.5 2.7 0.1
7 2.2 5.0 2.5 2.7 0.1
8 2.2 5.0 2.5 2.7 0.1
9 2.2 5.0 2.5 2.7 0.1
10 2.2 5.0 2.5 2.7 0.1
11 2.2 5.0 2.5 2.7 0.1
12 2.2 5.0 2.5 2.7 0.1
13 2.2 5.0 2.5 2.7 0.1
14 2.2 5.0 2.5 2.7 0.1
Table 2.20
Group 20
Period 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1 2.0 8.0* 5.5* 3.0 3.0 2.5 4.0 2.5 2.5 5.0
2 1.0 8.0* 4.5 1.0 2.0 1.0 3.0 2.5 2.5 3.0
3 1.0 6.0* 3.0 0.0 2.0 2.0 2.8 2.5 1.0 3.0
4 - 1.0 2.5 0.7 0.0 2.0 2.5 3.0 2.5 1.0 3.0
5 2.0 2.5 0.0 2.0 3.0 2.5 3.0 2.5 2.0 4.0
6 2.5 2.5 1.0 1.5 3.5 3.0 3.0 2.5 2.0 4.0
7 2.5 2.5 1.0 2.5 3.0 2.5 3.0 2.5 2.0 4.0
8 2.5 2.5 2.0 2.5 3.0 2.5 3.0 2.5 2.0 4.0
9 2.5 2.5 1.5 2.0 3.0 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.0 3.0
10 2.5 2.5 1.7 2.5 3.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.0 3.0
11 2.5 2.5 2.0 2.25 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.0 3.0
12 2.5 2.5 2.0 2.5 2.5 3.0 2.5 2.5 2.0 3.0
13 2.5 2.5 2.0 2.5 2.5 3.0 2.5 2.5 2.0 3.0




Period 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1 2.0 2,5 5.0 4.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 2.5 3.0 2.5
2 1.0 2.5 4.5 2.5 2.0 3.0 3.0 2.5 3.0 2.5
3 1.0 2.5 4.0 2.5 2.0 3.0 2.0 2.5 3.0 2.5
4 1.0 2.5 4.0 2.5 2.0 3.5 2.0 2.5 2.0 2.5
5 0.0 1.5 4.0 2.5 2.0 3.5 2.0 0.0 2.0 2.5
6 0.0 3.0 4.0 2.5 2.5 4.0 2.0 0.0 3.0 2.5
7 1.5 2.5 4.0 2.5 2.5 4.0 2.0 0.0 3.0 2.5
8 1.0 2.5 4.0 3.0 3.0 4.0 2.0 1.0 3.0 2.5
9 1.0 2.5 4.0 3.0 2.5 3.5 2.0 1.5 2.5 2.5
10 1.0 3.5 4.0 3.0 2.5 3.5 2.0 2.5 2.5 2.5
11 1.0 2.5 4.0 3.0 2.0 3.5 2.0 2.5 2.0 2.5
12 1.0 2.5 4.0 2.5 3.0 3.0 2.0 2.5 2.0 2.5
13 1.0 2.5 4.0 2.5 3.0 3.0 2.0 2.5 2.0 2.5
14 2.0 2.5 4.5 2.75 3.0 3.5 2.0 2.5 3.0 2.5
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